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Over  the  past  60 years  the  neural  correlates  of  human  episodic  memory  have  been  the  focus
of  intense  neuroscientiﬁc  scrutiny.  By contrast,  neuroscience  has  paid  substantially  less
attention to understanding  the  emergence  of  this  neurocognitive  system.  In this  review  we
consider how  the  study  of  memory  development  has  evolved.  In doing  so,  we  concentrate
primarily  on the  ﬁrst  postnatal  year  because  it is  within  this  time  window  that  the  most
dramatic  shifts  in scientiﬁc  opinion  have  occurred.  Moreover,  this  time  frame  includes  the
critical age  (∼9 months)  at which  human  infants  purportedly  ﬁrst begin  to  demonstrate
rudimentary  hippocampal-dependent  memory.  We  review  the evidence  for  and  against  this
assertion, note  the lack  of  direct  neurocognitive  data  speaking  to  this  issue,  and  questionfMRI
Episodic memory
Navigation
how  demonstrations  of exuberant  relational  learning  and  memory  in infants  as  young  as
3-months  old  can  be  accommodated  within  extant  models.  Finally,  we  discuss  whether
current  impasses  in the  infant  memory  literature  could  be  leveraged  by making  greater  use
of neuroimaging  techniques,  such  as  magnetic  resonance  imaging  (MRI),  which  have  been
deployed  so  successfully  in  adults.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd. 
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. Introduction
“You have to begin to lose your memory, if only in bits
and  pieces to realise that memory is what makes our
lives. Life without memory is no life at all. . .our mem-
ory is our coherence, our reason, our feeling, even our
action.  Without it, we are nothing. . ..” (Bunuel, 1983).
The above quotation attempts to describe life without
emory. Similar sentiments have been articulated time
nd  time again by those who have suffered memory loss
n  adulthood, and studies of amnesic patients have con-
rmed  the devastation that severe memory impairment
mposes on people’s lives. And yet, spend time with a young
nfant,  who is considered by many to possess the mnemonic
apabilities of a severely amnesic patient (Schacter and
oscovitch, 1984), and it is evident that the sentiments
xpressed above are not apposite (Rovee-Collier, 1997).
nfants are not, as William James (1890) proposed, liv-
ng  in a state of ‘blooming, buzzing confusion’. On the
ontrary, they appear to possess a remarkable capacity
o  encode and retain knowledge that is appropriate for
heir  current needs (Spear, 1984). For instance, shortly after
irth,  the human neonate can distinguish its mother’s voice
DeCasper and Fifer, 1980) and learn to modify its suck-
ng  behaviour in response to milk reinforcement (Sameroff,
971). By 3- to 4-days-old, it can recognise its mother’s
ace (Bushnell et al., 1989), and by 8- to 10-days-old it can
iscriminate its mother’s breast milk from that of another
other (MacFarlane, 1975). However, in stark contrast to
his  mnemonic ability, the human adult will almost cer-
ainly  be unable to recollect a single episode from their
nfancy, because during this period the human infant (along
ith  many other species) is considered to suffer from a
rofound form of memory loss known as infantile amnesia
Howe  and Courage, 1993).
In  this review we examine the main theoretical frame-
ork, adapted from the adult literature, that has attempted
o  account for these apparent disparities. We  discuss the
uccesses and failures of this approach, and ask whether
mpasses that exist today in the infant memory literature
ould be leveraged by making greater use of neuroimaging
echniques, such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI),
hat  have been deployed so successfully in adults. We
ave  much to gain by elucidating memory in infancy and
arly  childhood. Knowing what the very young are capable
f  encoding and retaining over different time periods
an inform the educational needs of these populations.
n so doing it can guide public policy, for example, by
ighlighting the beneﬁts that early stimulation, enriched
nvironments and varied experience have on the ﬂexibility
nd  development of infant memory (Cuevas et al., 2006).
here  are also implications for how young children are
ealt  with by the legal system, such as the impact of. . . .  . .  .  .  . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . . . . . .  .  .  .  .  . . . . 26
cross-examination on children’s testimony (Zajac and
Hayne, 2003; Hayne, 2007a). Understanding the matu-
ration of the memory system over time, the interactions
between it and the emergence of other cognitive processes,
such as episodic future thinking and spatial navigation,
could also enhance our understanding of these processes
in  the adult brain.
2.  Early theoretical inﬂuences
The  major theoretical inﬂuences in the infant memory
literature, as it stands today, can be traced back to 1984
when a number of inﬂuential papers on infant memory
were published. Two of these papers (Nadel and Zola-
Morgan, 1984; Schacter and Moscovitch, 1984; see also
Bachevalier and Mishkin, 1982) are directly tied to the
radical shift in the conceptualisation of memory that was
occurring in the adult literature at this time, namely the
move  away from considering memory as a unitary entity
(Squire, 2004). The roots of this departure are grounded in
the  cognitive and memory proﬁle of one patient in partic-
ular  – patient H.M. (Scoville and Milner, 1957). At age 27
H.M.  underwent bilateral resection of the medial temporal
lobes (MTL) to treat intractable epilepsy. This rendered him
densely  amnesic for new experiences (episodic memories).
On  this basis the MTL, and in particular the hippocampus
(Fig. 1), were identiﬁed as critical for the successful acqui-
sition  and recollection of episodic memories. H.M.’s ability
to  acquire new procedural skills such as mirror drawing
(Milner, 1962) pointed to a multiple systems account of
long-term memory. Although this latter implication was
not  fully appreciated at the time (because motor memory
was  considered to be a special, less cognitive, form of mem-
ory),  intact skills in amnesic patients were subsequently
documented across a wide range of perceptual and cogni-
tive  tasks (Cohen and Squire, 1980).
These demonstrations, coupled with ﬁndings from the
animal  literature which indicated that the hippocampus
supports speciﬁc types of memory (e.g. Gaffan, 1974; Hirsh,
1974;  O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Squire and Zola-Morgan,
1983), led to the idea that there were multiple memory
systems (Tulving, 1985). These were subsequently assim-
ilated  into a biological framework that listed the memory
type along with the supporting brain structures (Fig. 2).
In  essence, this taxonomy grouped all memory systems
that appeared to be preserved in amnesia (and in animals
with  hippocampal lesions) under the umbrella term
‘nondeclarative memory’ (Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1988).
Memory  systems which fell under this classiﬁcation were
deﬁned  as memories that could be expressed through
performance rather than recollection. On the other hand,
memories that appeared to be impaired in hippocampal
amnesia were ‘declarative’ in nature (Cohen and Squire,
1980), that is, they involved the conscious recollection
14 S.L. Mullally, E.A. Maguire / Developmental Co
Fig. 1. The human hippocampus. The top panel shows the hippocampi cir-
cled  in red on sagittal (left), coronal (middle) and axial (right) views from
a  structural MRI  brain scan. The hippocampus is composed of a number of
subﬁelds, CA1, CA2, CA3, which are adjoined by neighbouring areas – the
dentate gyrus (DG), the subiculum (SUB), presubiculum, parasubiculum,
and entorhinal cortex – to form the extended hippocampal formation.
Three-dimensional images of two example hippocampi are shown in the
bottom panel with some of the subregions indicated. From Mullally and
Maguire (2013). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of the article.)
Fig. 2. A taxonomy of long-term memory together with the brain structures purp
memory  can be further decomposed into memory for facts (semantic memory) a
(1996),  © National Academy of Sciences.gnitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12–29
of facts and events. Moreover, and unlike nondeclarative
memories, declarative memory was considered to enable
facts  and events to be represented in highly linked rela-
tional and ﬂexible networks (Cohen, 1984), a ﬂexibility
that was purported to permit these memories to be
consciously accessed and “declared” (Konkel and Cohen,
2009). Although this was  not the only theoretical account
proposed at the time, all extant views embodied a similar
outlook, i.e. that hippocampal damage compromises some
mnemonic processes while others are spared, and that the
memory  system that is impaired involves the represen-
tation of memories that are within conscious awareness
(or explicit memory; Graf and Schacter, 1985). Such
ideas went on to dominant memory research in the adult
literature for many decades (they have been questioned
in recent years – see Maguire and Mullally, 2013), largely
because it provided a useful biological framework by
which  memory performance, across an array of different
tasks, populations and species could be classiﬁed using a
similar  set of concrete criteria (Squire, 2004).
2.1. Multiple memory systems in infants
It is not surprising then that at this time in the 1980s
memory researchers began to ask whether similar disso-
ciations could be observed in infant memory (Nadel and
Zola-Morgan, 1984; Schacter and Moscovitch, 1984). Such
questions  came on the back of numerous studies conducted
in  the 1970s and early 1980s which started to challenge
the then prevailing view of infant memory, namely that
infants  lacked the capacity for long-term memory. These
studies presented clear evidence that even in the ini-
tial  hours and days after birth, infants were capable of
learning and expressing knowledge across long periods
of  time (Rovee-Collier and Fagen, 1981). However, these
studies  often lacked theoretical focus (Fagan, 1984; for
orted to be involved in supporting each system. As illustrated, declarative
nd memory for events (episodic memory). From Squire and Zola-Morgan
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xceptions see Cohen and Gelber, 1975; Olsen, 1976) and
heir  ﬁndings were typically “accounted for by invoking
 unitary concept of memory” (Schacter and Moscovitch,
984, p. 174). Guided by the current thinking, memory
esearchers examined the infant literature to see if the
pparent absence of certain forms of memory in infants,
oupled with demonstrations of quite strikingly intact
emory, could be explained within the multiple memory
ystem biological framework being advocated at the time.
For  example, Schacter and Moscovitch (1984) proposed
hat infants have two memory systems; an early system
hat  corresponds to nondeclarative memory (spared fol-
owing  hippocampal damage) that is available to infants
rom  birth, and a later system that corresponds to declar-
tive  memory (impaired following hippocampal damage)
hat  is available in the latter part of an infant’s ﬁrst
ear (at around 8–9 months of age; Kagan and Hamburg,
981). The authors argued that the visual paired com-
arison task (VPC; also referred to as habituation and
ovelty-preference paradigm) typically used to assess
nfant memory (where infants spend less time looking at
 familiar relative to a novel stimulus) actually tapped into
nconscious memory, and therefore did not provide evi-
ence  of early hippocampal-dependent memory. Schacter
nd  Moscovitch (1984) suggested that this was because
uccessful performance on such paradigms occurs as a
esult  of modiﬁcations of perceptual-cognitive processes
i.e.  priming processes) without any explicit knowledge of,
r  any explicit reference to, the study context.
While this proposal made theoretical sense, it is very dif-
cult,  if not impossible, to ascertain whether pre-linguistic
nfants have conscious awareness of the study context
r  not (Nelson, 1997; Rovee-Collier, 1997; Rovee-Collier
nd Cuevas, 2009). Given that this is the critical dimen-
ion upon which the multiple memory systems account
esides, it is necessary to look for other ways in which
nfant tasks can be accurately classiﬁed. In order to achieve
his,  Schacter and Moscovitch (1984) proposed what later
ecame  known as the ‘parameter’ ﬁlter. The logic here is
hat  as performance on tasks of declarative memory is typ-
cally  inﬂuenced by variables such as retention interval,
tudy duration and context changes, whereas performance
n  nondeclarative tasks is not, then identifying whether a
ask  is impacted by the manipulation of these variables can
ssist  the classiﬁcation of the task as either declarative or
ondeclarative (Hayne, 2007b). Schacter and Moscovitch
1984) reviewed data from numerous VPC studies avail-
ble  at the time and concluded that variables such as
etention interval did not appear to alter infants’ per-
ormance (e.g. Fagan, 1971, 1973). This resistance to the
mpact  of increasing the retention interval was interpreted
s  evidence of the nondeclarative nature of the tasks. This,
herefore, supported the proposal that the early mnemonic
chievements of young infants are attributable to an early,
on-hippocampal-dependent, memory system.
What of the suggested late memory system? Adopt-
ng the parameter ﬁlter again, Schacter and Moscovitch
1984) argued that one could examine the effect of modal-
ty  shifts between study and test, a manipulation that is
ften  detrimental to performance on nondeclarative prim-
ng  tasks, but which does not typically impact performancegnitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12–29 15
on  declarative memory tasks, to garner such evidence.
Interestingly, novelty preference had been shown to be
eliminated in young infants (6- to 9-months) via a cross
modal switch between study and test, an impairment
which is not evident in older infants (12-months; Gottfried
et  al., 1977), when the late (declarative) memory system
has  matured sufﬁciently to support this switch. Thus, ten-
tative  evidence appeared to exist in favour of this early/late
memory systems account of infant memory.
Since its proposal almost 30 years ago, this account,
which is often referred to as the neuromaturational account
(Rovee-Collier and Giles, 2010), has received much support
and  is still a dominant view in the ﬁeld of infant memory
(Bauer, 2006, 2008). However, there is controversy sur-
rounding the question of how tasks suitable for use in
infants  and young children are classiﬁed. Another bench-
mark  of declarative memory that is commonly used is the
‘amnesia’  ﬁlter (Squire and Schacter, 2002), whereby a task
is  considered to be declarative (and hence hippocampal-
dependent) if performance on the same task is impaired in
adult  patients with hippocampal amnesia. However, even
with  both the ‘parameter’ and the ‘amnesia’ ﬁlters in place,
there  is still debate about whether some of the key tasks
used  in the infant literature should be classiﬁed as declar-
ative  or nondeclarative. These key tasks include the VPC
paradigms previously discussed, as well as operant condi-
tioning  (e.g. the mobile conjugate reinforcement paradigm
–  Fig. 3A, and the train paradigm – Fig. 3B; Rovee-Collier
and Hayne, 2000) and imitation protocols. In the latter
tasks, a demonstration of an action or sequence of actions
is  given and infants imitate this action either immediately
(elicited imitation), or after a delay period (deferred imita-
tion).
As  with the VPC, Schacter and Moscovitch (1984)
argued that the operant conditioning paradigm devised by
Rovee-Collier and Fagen (1981; Fig. 3) is nondeclarative in
nature  and thus dismissed the early ﬁndings of advanced
mnemonic function in 3- to 5-month-old infants (Rovee-
Collier et al., 1980; Rovee-Collier and Fagen, 1981). Similar
concerns regarding the operant conditioning paradigm
(and in particular the mobile conjugate reinforcement,
Fig. 3A) have been expressed by others (Bauer, 2008) who
argue  that such tasks most likely depend upon the cerebel-
lum  and deep nuclei of the brain stem, which mature earlier
than  the hippocampus, and which most likely support a
primitive,  nondeclarative memory system. However, using
the  parameter ﬁlter, variables such as age, retention inter-
val,  study time and context changes have all been found
to  inﬂuence performance on the VPC, tasks of operant con-
ditioning  and imitation procedures (Hayne, 2004; Rovee-
Collier,  1997), suggesting these tasks should be considered
declarative in nature. Similarly, variables that inﬂuence
adults’ performance on declarative memory tasks, such as
interference, levels of processing and serial position, also
impact  infants’ performance on the deferred imitation task
(Hayne,  2007b), leading to the same conclusion, that all
three  of these paradigms appear to tap into declarative, as
opposed  to nondeclarative, processes (Hayne, 2004).
The  use of the amnesia ﬁlter as a tool for classify-
ing these tasks also indicates that the VPC (McKee and
Squire, 1993; Pascalis et al., 2004) and deferred imitation
16 S.L. Mullally, E.A. Maguire / Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12–29
Fig. 3. The operant conditioning paradigms. (A) The mobile conjugate reinforcement paradigm (Rovee-Collier et al., 1980; suitable for use in 2–7 month
old  infants). The left panel illustrates phase 1: the baseline condition. Here the ankle ribbon is not connected to the mobile so that when the infant kicks
they  do not move the mobile. The middle panel illustrates phase 2, the acquisition phase, where the ankle ribbon and the mobile are connected so that
when  the infant kicks, the mobile conjugately moves. The right panel illustrates phase 3, the retention phase. Here, as in phase 1, the ankle ribbon and the
mobile  are not connected. However, if the infant recognised the mobile, they should kick to move the mobile. Memory of the mobile is therefore indexed
by  an increased rate of kicking in phase 3 relative to phase 1. (B) The operant train task (Hartshorn and Rovee-Collier, 1997; suitable for use in 6–24 month
s a basel
 lever pr
in deacold  infants). As with the operant mobile task, phase 1 (left panel) provide
presses  the lever the train does not move. In phase 2 (middle panel), each
infant’s  age). In phase 3 (right panel–the retention phase) the lever is aga
pressing  relative to the baseline pressing rate in phase 1.
(McDonough et al., 1995; Adlam et al., 2005) paradigms are
hippocampal-dependent and should be classiﬁed as declar-
ative  (Nelson, 1995). Of note, the amnesia ﬁlter is agnostic
with  respect to the classiﬁcation of the operant condition-
ing  task because the mobile task is unsuitable for use in
adult  populations (or children over 6 months of age – see
Fig.  3), and after the age of 2 years, participants simply cease
performing the train task, declaring to the experimenter in
phase  3 that the train is broken, or that the batteries need to
be  replaced (Hildreth and Hill, 2003; Hsu and Rovee-Collier,
2006). Interestingly, however, Gross et al. (2002) reported
identical results when 6-month-old infants were tested
on  both operant and imitation tasks, suggesting that these
two  measures may  tap into the same underlying function.
2.2.  The emergence of declarative memory
If one accepts that these tasks tap into one underlying
memory system, then the key question is when does the
memory  system that supports these tasks become func-
tional?  Hayne (2007b) has argued that across multiple
laboratories and studies using the VPC, operant condi-
tioning or imitation paradigms, consistent patterns have
emerged which can be summarised in terms of three gen-
eral  principles (Hayne, 2004). First, older infants encode
information faster than younger infants. For example, using a
VPC  task, Fantz (1964) found that 3- to 4-month-old infants
needed  more exposure to the familiar stimulus in order to
demonstrate a novelty preference than 4- to 6-month-old
infants, and Rose (1983) reported that 6-month-old infantsine measure. Here the lever is deactivated and therefore when the infant
ess made by the infant moves the toy train for 1 or 2 s (depending on the
tivated and memory for the train is indexed by an increased rate of lever
required  a 15 s exposure to the familiarisation stimulus, but
that  by 12 months this time had decreased to 10 s. Similarly,
on  the mobile conjugate reinforcement task, 2-month-old
infants typically learned the task within 3–6 min  (Davis and
Rovee-Collier, 1983), 3-month-old infants learned within
2–3  min  (Greco et al., 1986), and 6-month-old infants
within 1 min (Hill et al., 1988); and on a task of deferred
imitation, 6-month-old infants required twice as much
exposure to the target actions than older infants (12-, 18-,
and  24-month-olds; Barr et al., 1996). Thus, increasing age
appears  to correspond to a shortening of encoding times
across a range of mnemonic paradigms. Second, younger
infants appear to remember for shorter periods of time. Six-
month-old infants imitated actions for only 24 h (Meltzoff,
1988), 9-month-olds recollected actions for up to 5 weeks
(but  not 3 months), while just 1 month later, 10-month-
olds could reproduce the same actions for up to 3 months
(Carver and Bauer, 2001; see also Fig. 4). Finally, memory
in  younger infants is considered to be highly speciﬁc, with
older  children utilising a wider range of retrieval cues than
their  younger counterparts. For example, in an imitation
task, retrieval is easily disrupted by a change in the cues
between encoding and test (Hayne, 2004; Rovee-Collier,
1997). In addition, Hayne et al. (2000) demonstrated that
when  either the form or the colour of a puppet was  changed
at  test (relative to the original demonstration), 6- and 12-
(but  not 18-) month old infants’ performance at retrieval
was  disrupted, while a major change in context between
the study and the test phases left 6- (but not 12- or 18-)
month old infants impaired.
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Fig. 4. Standardised reference functions for the maximum duration reten-
tion  of infants on the operant mobile, operant train and deferred imitation
puppet tasks. Maximum retention duration (x-axis) appears to increase
linearly as a function of increasing age (y-axis). Note that the difference in
the  slope of the two functions is attributed to the different training param-
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he  American Psychological Association.
Evidently, and despite age-related changes across
hese three dimensions, declarative (or hippocampal-
ependent) memory appears to be evident by the middle
f  the ﬁrst year and perhaps even earlier (Hayne, 2007b),
hich is long before the age originally suggested by
chacter and Moscovitch (1984) and advocated more
ecently by others (Bauer, 2006, 2008). Moreover, princi-
les  1 and 2 do not necessarily appear to provide evidence
f  an early (or primitive) memory system which gives way
o  a late, more sophisticated, declarative memory system.
ather these ﬁndings could simply be indicative of a mem-
ry  system (which we will, for now, continue to refer to
s  a declarative memory system) that is rapidly develop-
ng  and increases monotonically throughout infancy but
hich,  during this development, is fragile and less efﬁcient.
ig.  4 illustrates the linearity between observed retention
uration (on the operant mobile and train tasks and the
eferred imitation task) and age. No sudden shifts in reten-
ion  duration are evident at any age point, which would
resumably be anticipated if a sudden shift between mem-
ry  systems was occurring. This unitary interpretation is
upported  by the work of Rovee-Collier and colleagues who
rgue  that, given sufﬁcient support, the enduring nature of
nfant  memory can be enhanced. For instance, 2-month-
lds typically forget the mobile conjugate reinforcement
ask (Fig. 3A) within 1–2 days. However, retention can
e  extended if the infant is exposed to regular reminders
very 3 weeks (Rovee-Collier et al., 1999). In fact, in this
tudy,  retention was still evident at 7.25 months, a full 4.5
onths  after initial acquisition, at which point it could be
ssessed  no further due to the inappropriate nature of the
ask  for older children. Critically, a control group who were
xposed  to the same reminders but not the initial acqui-
ition showed no retention, ensuring that it was the task,
nd  not the reminders of the task, that was being recalledgnitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12–29 17
at  test. Furthermore, in a follow-up study in older chil-
dren (which therefore used the operant conditioning train
paradigm), acquisition of the task occurred when infants
were  6-months-old, followed by ﬁve spaced reminders in
the  intervening period (with the ﬁnal reminder occurring at
18-months  of age). This resulted in the infants (now 2 years
of  age) exhibiting signiﬁcant retention of the task 1.5 years
after  acquisition (Hartshorn, 2003). Therefore, very young
infants  (i.e. 2- or 6-month-olds) appear capable of form-
ing  enduring memories provided the retention of those
memories is given sufﬁcient support. Why  these memories
require such support remains an open question.
Notably, similar ﬁndings have been observed using tasks
of  deferred imitation, which are accepted by many to tap
into  the declarative memory system (but see Newcombe
et al., 2012). For instance, the retention duration of a multi-
step  sequence (remove the mitten from the puppet’s hand,
shake  the mitten, replace the mitten; see Fig. 5) can be
increased by manipulating a number of factors. Barr et al.
(2005)  observed deferred imitation for at least 10 weeks
after  the initial exposure in 6-month-old infants, provided
the  infants retrieved the memory of the sequence of actions
on  multiple occasions within this 10-week period and that
these  retrievals were widely spaced out in time. Similarly,
Campanella and Rovee-Collier (2005) found that 3-month-
old  infants retained and imitated modelled actions when
retention was tested 3 months after acquisition, when the
infants  were now 6-months-old, provided the memory of
the  actions had been periodically reactivated in the inter-
vening  time period. Thus, enduring ordered recall is evident
in  very young infants and these data (plus the results of
the  operant conditioning tasks discussed above) appear
to  demand a radical shift in how we conceptualise the
mnemonic capabilities of very young children. Moreover,
they beg questions of the neuroscientiﬁc community to
provide  explanations of how these memory traces are being
acquired  and consolidated in such immature brains.
2.3. The emergence of episodic memory
Until now we have used the term declarative memory to
refer  to memories that depend upon the hippocampus. This
is  largely because ‘declarative’ memory and ‘hippocampal-
dependent’ memory were once viewed as synonymous
and, although controversial, declarative memory (via the
use  of the parameter and amnesia ﬁlters) was relatively
easy to assess in infants, as described earlier. However, it is
highly  likely that there is more to hippocampal-dependent
memory than declarative processes, and in recent years
the  type of memory that has been most associated with
the  hippocampus is episodic memory – the memory for
our  personal past experiences. Hence, in order to be truly
convinced that young infants are utilising a hippocampal-
dependent memory system then we  need to also look for
evidence  of episodic memory in this population.
Some have argued that children under the age of 4- or
5-years of age are unable to form episodic memories (e.g.
Tulving,  2005). Because episodic memory is difﬁcult (if not
impossible) to assess in the absence of language (Clayton
et  al., 2003), such studies often utilise ‘episodic-like’ mem-
ory  paradigms (for a review see Salwiczek et al., 2010)
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Fig. 5. Sensory preconditioning and the deferred imitation puppet task (Barr et al., 2003). The left panel illustrates the sensory preconditioning whereby
an  infant receives paired pre-exposure to puppet A and puppet B. In phase 2 (middle panel) the target actions (remove the mitten from the puppet’s hand,
shake  the mitten, replace the mitten) were demonstrated for the infant on puppet A. The deferred imitation test then occurs in phase 3 (right panel). Here
ated if t
otorica
lsevier.the  memory of the pairing between puppet A and puppet B is demonstr
performed  by infants aged 6 months and above, as younger infants are m
reproduced  from Rovee-Collier and Giles (2010) with the permission of E
which attempt to measure the recollection of “happenings
in particular places at particular times” (Tulving, 2002, p.
3),  or the ‘what-where-when’ (www) of episodic memory
(Tulving, 1972). While episodic-like memory (or ‘www-
memory’) paradigms have been successfully utilised across
a  range of nonhuman species (Clayton and Dickinson,
1998; Ergorul and Eichenbaum, 2004; Martin-Ordas et al.,
2010),  more recent studies have employed this approach
to  track the emergence of episodic memory across child-
hood. For instance, Hayne and Imuta (2011) developed
a  hide-and-seek paradigm to assess young children’s (3-
and  4-year-olds) ability to recollect the ‘www’ of a hid-
ing  event, while Bauer et al. (2012) focused their attention
on  identifying the point at which the ‘where’ of personally
experienced events is successfully bound with the event
details  themselves. In keeping with previous hypotheses
(Tulving, 2002, 2005), this form of memory appears to show
a  protracted development throughout early and middle
childhood, although rudimentary episodic memory skills
do  appear to be in place by the age of 3 (Hayne and
Imuta, 2011). Interestingly, more recent ﬁndings have sug-
gested  that it is the ability to retain, as opposed to form,
episodic memories that may  be the source of the advantage
inferred through age in older children, with 3-year-old chil-
dren  demonstrating good retention of episodic recollection
across short but not long delays (Scarf et al., 2013).
Interestingly, the ‘www-memory’ approach has ﬁrmly
aligned itself with the associative/relational account of
episodic  memory (for review see Eichenbaum, 2004).
Under this model, episodic memory processes are consid-
ered  to involve the binding together of disparate pieces
of  information (the what, where and when) to form a
sequentially organised, novel, associative representation of
the  event in question. This associative representation doeshe infant models the target actions on puppet B. This phase can only be
lly incapable of performing the target actions themselves. Lower panels
not,  however, occur in isolation; instead it overlaps with
other  associative representations that share a common ele-
ment  (e.g. with episodic memories that have occurred in
the  same location). In this way, common elements serve
to  organise episodic memories into relational networks,
linking new and existing memories to one another. Such
networks enable the individual to compare and contrast
memories, to make inferences among indirectly related
episodic events, and even to form expectations about future
experiences. It is this ﬂexibility, ultimately afforded by the
associative nature of episodic memory, that is considered
by many to be a fundamental feature of hippocampal-
dependent memory (Eichenbaum, 2004). Hence, it can be
appreciated why  many developmental scientists consider
that  at its heart, the development of episodic memory “is
the  development of the ability to bind together informa-
tion co-occurring at a particular time in a particular spatial
context” (Newcombe et al., 2012, p. 75) and why  relational
memory is considered to be a canonical form of episodic
memory (Koski et al., 2013). The question is, therefore, at
what  age do basic associative/relational processes become
apparent, and can we use this as evidence of episodic-like
memory abilities in infancy?
As  previously discussed, one characteristic of infants’
memory performance on the tasks described earlier is
that  it appears to be highly speciﬁc and inﬂexible (Hayne,
2004, principle 3 above), and hence incompatible with
the  above characterisation of episodic memory. However,
recent demonstrations suggest that under certain condi-
tions,  and contrary to these earlier ﬁndings, very young
infants can (1) form spontaneous and enduring associ-
ations, and (2) are capable of using these associative
representations in a ﬂexible manner. For instance, using the
mobile  conjugate reinforcement paradigm in combination
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Fig. 6. (A) The hypothesised associative representation containing each element of the event sequence depicted in Fig. 5 – the deferred imitation puppet
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 and puppet B (encoded by the infants during the sensory pre-conditio
ssociations (associations bound to puppet A) across contexts (to puppet
ith a sensory pre-conditioning phase (where the infants
ere  pre-exposed to the study and test contexts, which in
his  case were two distinctive cloth panels), Boller (1997)
ound  that 6-month-old infants continued to show sig-
iﬁcant  retention of the mobile task (Fig. 3) despite a
hange in context between study and test. Critically, this
as  only observed for the infants who were pre-exposed
o the cloth panels simultaneously; with the typical pat-
ern  of impairment evident in the control infants who had
een  pre-exposed to the two contexts individually but
ot  simultaneously. Thus, the pre-exposed infants seemed
o  spontaneously form a lasting association between the
ontexts  in the sensory pre-conditioning phase, and this
ssociative representation appeared sufﬁcient to enable
hem  to demonstrate a ﬂexibility often assumed to be
bsent  in young infants’ memory. Similarly, Barr et al.
2003) pre-conditioned 6-month-old infants to two hand
uppets  (A and B; see Fig. 5A, left panel) using a simi-
ar  simultaneous presentation technique. The infants then
bserved  a sequence of three target actions (i.e. remove the
itten  from the puppet’s hand, shake the mitten, replace
he  mitten) demonstrated on puppet A (Fig. 5A, middle
anel). Twenty-four hours later this group of infants spon-
aneously imitated these actions on puppet B (Fig. 5A,
ight  panel) thus demonstrating a transfer of knowledge
rom puppet A to puppet B. Critically however, infants
ho had the same amount of pre-exposure to puppets A
nd  B, but not simultaneous pre-exposure, did not model
he  actions on puppet B, suggesting these control infants
ad  not formed an association between puppets A and
,  and that the absence of this association rendered the
emory isolated and non-transferable. Importantly, the
peciﬁcity demonstrated by the control infants (and those
n  previous studies, e.g. Hayne et al., 2000), in tandem with
he  ﬂexibility demonstrated by the experimental infants,
rgues against the suggestion that infants under the age
f  2 years form only generalised or semantic representa-
ions of event sequences (Newcombe et al., 2012). This is
ecause  the above pattern of results demands that both
roups’ recollection of the original event sequence must
ecessarily have contained speciﬁc item details, i.e. the
dentity of puppet A (Fig. 6). Hence, it is plausible that theseelational network which also contains the association between puppet
ase), which subsequently enables the infant to transfer context-speciﬁc
infants  formed an associative representation of the event
sequences, which in the case of the experimental group,
was  subsumed into a larger relational network that also
included the association between puppet A and puppet B
(Fig.  6B). Thus, these fundamental associative elements of
episodic  memory may  in fact be present in 6-month-old
infants.
Interestingly, spontaneous associative learning is also
evident in even younger infants. For instance, Campanella
and Rovee-Collier (2005) found that 6-month-old infants
spontaneously imitated target actions on puppet B, even
though  the simultaneous pre-exposure to the puppet pair
(i.e.  to puppets A and B), and the modelling of the target
actions on puppet A, had occurred 3 months earlier, when
the  infants were just 3-months-old. The transfer of learn-
ing  from puppet A to puppet B observed here occurred
in spite of a 3-month delay between the sensory pre-
conditioning phase, where the association between the
puppet  A and puppet B was learned, and the test phase
(note, memory of the target actions was periodically reac-
tivated  with puppet A during this time). As before, the
infants who  had sequential but not simultaneous pre-
exposure to puppets A and B did not model the actions
on  puppet B in phase 3 despite the fact that they (like
the  simultaneously pre-exposed group) had observed the
target  actions performed on puppet A on multiple occa-
sions.
These  results demonstrate that even 3-month-old
infants seem capable of forming spontaneous associations
between simultaneously occurring events and appear to
use  this associative knowledge ﬂexibly in a novel context.
But  do these infants also form associations between items
that  have never been previously encountered together
which, as discussed above, is often considered a key feature
of  a ﬂexible memory system (Eichenbaum, 1997; Squire
and  Kandel, 1999)? Tasks where associations between
indirectly related stimuli must be inferred are known as
transitive inference tasks and the acquisition of transitive
inferences was once considered to emerge around 7 years
of  age (Piaget, 1928; Townsend et al., 2010). Cuevas et al.
(2006),  however, tested whether such ﬂexibility could be
demonstrated in 6-month-old infants.
ental Co
2012;  see also Wills et al., 2010; Langston et al., 2010)
with all the basic components of a rat’s hippocampal nav-20 S.L. Mullally, E.A. Maguire / Developm
Here, the infants were simultaneously exposed to pup-
pets  A and B (phase 1: association between puppet A and B
presumed  to be formed) and then trained to kick a mobile
in  a distinctive context 24 h later (phase 2: association
between mobile and context presumed to be formed). A
third  phase then ensued where the infants were exposed
to  puppet A (without the presence of puppet B) in the
distinctive context (without the presence of the mobile).
Thus in phase 3, the presence of puppet A was  presumed
to activate the associated memory of puppet B, while the
distinctive context was presumed to activate the associ-
ated  memory of the mobile. The question was whether this
would  lead to the formation of a new association between
the  co-activated memory representations (puppet B and
the  mobile) despite the fact that neither puppet B nor the
mobile  were ever physically presented together. Interest-
ingly, this was what Cuevas et al. (2006) found. Moreover,
this association appeared to persist for up to 2 weeks.
Therefore, under certain conditions, very young infants’
memory appears to be far from rigid and speciﬁc.
However, what about the previously-described ﬁndings
that  failed to ﬁnd evidence of ﬂexibility in infant mem-
ory  (e.g. Hayne et al., 2000)? One explanation proposes
that it is infants’ lack of world knowledge and experi-
ence (Rovee-Collier and Cuevas, 2009) that is the source
of  this apparent inﬂexibility. For example, Richmond and
Nelson  (2007) proposed that the inclusion of a sensory
pre-conditioning phase where the infants learned about
the  relationship between two items (e.g. between puppet
A  and puppet B), provides the prior knowledge, or rela-
tional  network, into which the novel event (or associative
representation) can be embedded. This then enables the
infant  to demonstrate these surprisingly advanced forms
of  relational memory. Hence, in experimental contexts
where this support is absent, infants may  lack a sufﬁciently
rich network of knowledge within which to integrate the
event,  and the absence of this knowledge-based network
renders the memory isolated and inﬂexible (Barr et al.,
2011).  In support of this idea, Richmond and Nelson (2007)
cited  the observation that 9-month-old infants who are
able  to crawl and likely acquire a richer representation
of their environment (or the ‘where’ of their episodic
memories) than their non-crawling counterparts appear
to  be more capable of using their memory in a ﬂexible
manner than infants who are not yet crawling (Herbert
et  al., 2007). In a similar vein, Jones et al. (2011) sought
to  determine whether the limitations in representational
ﬂexibility (i.e. the failure to recognise previously viewed
stimuli when presented on a new background) observed in
infants  younger than 18-months by Robinson and Pascalis
(2004)  could be overcome by the provision of variabil-
ity training during encoding (i.e. the presentation of the
studied  item on multiple backgrounds). Signiﬁcantly, they
demonstrated that this training enabled infants as young
as  6-months-old to recognise the studied item when it
was  subsequently presented on a novel background. Such
ﬁndings  are consistent with the proposal that an apparent
inﬂexibility in infants’ memory may  be driven by their lack
of  world knowledge and experience, and not necessarily
by an absence of a ﬂexible associative/relational memory
ability.gnitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12–29
2.4.  A transitional age in the ontogeny of episodic
memory?
While there is evidence that very young infants may
be  capable of impressive mnemonic feats (including ﬂex-
ibility),  it is perhaps noteworthy that infants begin to
crawl  and hence gain the associated cognitive beneﬁts
of  independent locomotion at ∼9 months. This is inter-
esting as 9-months has been consistently described by
memory theorists as a critical transitional age whereby
infant memory appears to undergo a radical develop-
ment. As previously described, many have argued that at
this  age one memory system (an early developing non-
declarative memory system) is supplanted by another (a
late  developing declarative memory system; Schacter and
Moscovitch, 1984; Bauer, 2006, 2008), or a pre-explicit
memory system is supplanted by an explicit one (Richmond
and  Nelson, 2007), while others have described this as the
age  at which the period of exuberant associative learn-
ing  observed in early infanthood appears to come to an
end  (Rovee-Collier and Giles, 2010). Additional evidence
that  this represents an important developmental age in
the  ontogeny of hippocampal-dependent memory comes
from  the work of Bauer and colleagues (Carver et al., 2000).
They  found that 9-month-old infants who  successfully
imitated previously-learned event sequences also showed
brain  activity patterns consistent with recollection (i.e. a
late  positive slow wave component of the ERP response;
Paller and Kutas, 1992), which was  lacking in the 9-month-
old  infants who did not imitate (Carver et al., 2000) and
in  amnesic patients (Düzel et al., 2001; Addante et al.,
2012).  Richmond and Nelson (2009) recently utilised an
eye-tracking technique (previously employed to investi-
gate  relational memory in adult amnesia; Hannula et al.,
2007),  to demonstrate that 9-month-old infants can encode
the  relations among items (i.e. between novel faces super-
imposed on unique scenic backgrounds; but see also Koski
et  al., 2013). However, it is unclear from these data sets
whether infants below the age of 9-months would also
demonstrate a late positive slow wave (ERP) or show evi-
dence  of successful relational encoding (eye tracking).
Nevertheless, the fact that Herbert et al.’s (2007) ﬁnd-
ings  tentatively linked the emergence of ﬂexible memory
to  the onset of independent locomotion resonates with a
hypothesis  proposed by Nadel and Zola-Morgan (1984).
They  argued that true episodic memory (that encapsulates
the ‘when’ and ‘where’ of the recollected episode) will only
be  possible once an organism is capable of hippocampal-
dependent place learning (i.e. allocentric spatial learning).
In  support of this they cited ﬁndings from the animal lit-
erature  demonstrating that place learning appears quite
abruptly on postnatal day 19 in the life of a rat (e.g. Suther-
land,  1982, personal communication; cited in Nadel and
Zola-Morgan, 1984), and linked this form of learning with
the  emergence of the hippocampal memory system. This
coincides with more recent observations that adult-like
grid cells ﬁrst emerge on postnatal day 19 (Wills et al.,igation  system in place by 3 weeks of age, which is also
the  age at which weanlings ﬁrst start to leave their nest
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Gerrish and Alberts, 1996) to begin independent spatial
xploration. (Note: this is also the age at which the effects
f  rat infantile amnesia begin to dissipate, with infantile
mnesia appearing strongest in rat pups <21-days-old; for
eview  see Callaghan et al., 2014). Prior to the emergence of
his  place learning, Nadel and Zola-Morgan (1984) argued
hat  although the experiencing of events will inﬂuence
n  organism (and ‘leave behind some residue’), true “in
lace”  memory will not be evident, which resonates with
he  hypothesis that prior to the advent of crawling in a
uman  infant’s life, memory appears to be inﬂexible and
omewhat improvised. In this way, independent locomo-
ion  may  herald the development of more sophisticated
patial knowledge, which in turn may  provide the scaffold-
ng  (the “in place” or the “where” component of episodic
emory) necessary to support ﬂexible and complex recol-
ections  of past experiences.
Returning  to the idea that 9-months of age represents
he end of an period of exuberant associative learning,
eynolds and Rovee-Collier (2005, cited in Rovee-Collier
nd Giles, 2010) found that both 6- and 9-month-old
nfants who were simultaneously pre-exposed to puppet
 and puppet B (Fig. 5), and who observed target actions
erformed on puppet A, recollected and performed the
odelled actions on puppet B after a 2 (but not a three)
eek delay. Twelve-month-old infants however failed to
emonstrate the actions after any delay. This raises the
nteresting possibility that very young infants may  actu-
lly  form more spontaneous associations and retain these
ssociations for longer time periods than older infants. Sim-
larly,  Cuevas et al. (2009; cited in Rovee-Collier and Giles,
010)  found that while 6-month-old infants associated the
wo  puppets following simultaneous but not sequential
re-exposure, 9-month-old infants associated the puppets
fter  either simultaneous or sequential pre-exposure, but
2-month-old infants only associated puppets that had
een  sequentially, but not simultaneously, presented. This
uggests  that there is a change in what infants sponta-
eously associate before and after this critical age period.
his  has led some to propose that the exuberant learning
hich appears to occur in very early infancy spontaneously
nds around the transitional age of 9 months (Rovee-Collier
nd Giles, 2010). Understanding the neural events that
ccur  prior to, during, and after this transitional period is
ver,  could shed important light on the neural substrates
nderpinning both of these phases and help to address the
uestion  of whether this represents a fundamental shift
etween memory systems or an incremental change within
he  infants’ ﬂedgling episodic memory system. Regardless,
he  above ﬁndings suggest that very young infants are
otentially utilising a more sophisticated form of memory
han  many theories of early memory development would
uggest.
How  close do these data move us towards under-
tanding whether very young infants have a functional
pisodic memory system? In other words, is evidence
hat very young infants are capable of forming and rec-
llecting complex relational memories akin to providing
vidence that these infants are forming and subsequently
ecollecting complex episodic memories? Many would
rgue  that this is not sufﬁcient. For instance, the questiongnitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12–29 21
of  whether successful performance on a ‘www-memory’
paradigm is analogous to true episodic memory has been
ﬁercely debated in the literature (for review see Salwiczek
et  al., 2010). Moreover, Tulving’s original ‘www-deﬁnition’
of episodic memory (Tulving, 1972) has been updated
a  number of times so that it now includes a conscious
awareness that an event is ‘remembered’ as opposed to
being  simply familiar or ‘known’ (autonoetic conscious-
ness; Tulving, 1985), and an ability to use episodic memory
to  project oneself into both the past and future (chrones-
thesia; Tulving, 2002). Strict adherence to such a complex
and  linguistically-dependent deﬁnition of episodic mem-
ory  makes establishing whether episodic memory deﬁned
along  these dimensions is present in very young infants
almost impossible (although a number of researchers have
attempted to explore it in children aged 3-years and
older; e.g. Scarf et al., 2013; Russell et al., 2010; Busby
and Suddendorf, 2005). Can any evidence of a functioning
episodic memory system be gathered by studying chil-
dren’s  earliest memories? And if such evidence is present,
how  can the above reports of ﬂexible associative mem-
ory  in early infancy be reconciled with the phenomenon
of infantile amnesia?
3.  Children’s earliest memories
The offset of infantile amnesia occurs between 3 and 5
years  of age, and this offset is often considered to herald the
onset  of a memory system capable of supporting enduring
episodic memories. Support for this comes from a century
of  empirical evidence. In one such study, college students
were asked to recollect childhood memories of signiﬁcant
early life events (such as the birth of a sibling, the death
of  a close relative, a period of hospitalisation; Usher and
Neisser, 1993). Despite the dramatic nature of these events,
participants rarely reported any memories prior to the age
of  two, and only incomplete memories until the age of four,
and  thus conformed to most adults’ subjective experience
of  infantile amnesia. However, there is an important caveat
in  the infantile amnesia literature in that most studies have
been  conducted in adult populations. Such studies cannot
therefore address the question of whether children them-
selves  experience the same degree of infantile amnesia. In
respect  of this, Sheingold and Teeney (1982) found that
young  children recalled little of a sibling’s birth if this birth
occurred  prior to their 4th birthday, and this did not appear
to  be related to the participant’s age at the time of testing
(which ranged from 4- to 12-years of age). This appeared
to conﬁrm the ﬁndings of studies conducted in adults.
However, a different picture begins to emerge when
children’s earliest episodic memories are speciﬁcally tar-
geted.  Peterson et al. (2005) found evidence to suggest
that the age of a child’s earliest episodic memory is inﬂu-
enced  by that child’s current age, with younger children
appearing capable of recollecting memories from signif-
icantly younger ages than older children. Similarly, in a
recent  and comprehensive investigation of the offset of
childhood amnesia in developmental populations, Tustin
and  Hayne (2010) found that the earliest memories accu-
rately  reported by children and adolescents occurred at
signiﬁcantly younger ages than the traditional 3.5-year-old
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Table  1
Distribution of early memories from the 0 to 12 months of age time bracket.
Participant age
Age of memory 5-years 8–9 years 12–13 years 18–20 years Total
0–1 months 4 4
1–2  months
2–3 months 1 1 2
3–4  months
4–5 months
5–6 months 1  1
6–7  months
7–8 months
8–9 months
9–10 months
10–11 months
11–12  months 1 1
Total 3 5 0 0 8
Tustin and Hayne, personal communication; taken from Tustin and Hayne (2010).
Of the 8 early memories that were recollected by participants, all but one occurred prior to the age of 6-months of age. Signiﬁcantly, these very early memories
ds and t
d betwewere  only provided by the two youngest age groups tested (the 5 year ol
two  older groups (the 12–13 year olds and the 18–20 year olds) occurre
within  the above time frame.
boundary of infantile amnesia observed in adults. In fact,
both  groups of children, who were either 5-years-old or 8-
to  9-years-old at the time of testing, had an average age for
their  earliest memory of less than 2 years, and in 12- to 13-
year-olds  this rose slightly to 2.5-years of age. Interestingly,
in the same study, Tustin and Hayne (2010) also elicited
early memories of episodic events that had occurred prior
to  their participants’ 3rd birthdays. When these data were
combined, the earliest memory of some children, who were
under  the age of 10 at the time of testing, was for events that
had  occurred when they were less than 1-year-old. In fact,
memories of episodic events occurring between birth and
1-year  of age accounted for over 20% of all the early mem-
ories  given by these children. When inspected further, all
but  one of these very early memories occurred before the
age  of 6-months (see Table 1; Tustin and Hayne, personal
communication). More striking still was the observation
that 50% of these very early memories were of events that
had  occurred when the children in question were less than
1-month-old. These memories were accurate (veriﬁed by a
parent)  and episodic in nature. These ﬁndings, albeit from
one  study, therefore suggest that extremely young infants
are  potentially capable of encoding a proportion of their
personal experiences from birth, and that at least some of
these  memories can be later recollected in an episodic man-
ner  up to 8- or 9-years later, potentially challenging the
previous theoretical accounts of infant memory (see also
Jack  et al., 2012).
Why  these memories are sparse and why after the age
of  10 these memories then become inaccessible or forgot-
ten  are intriguing questions. One possibility is that very
early  episodic memories are not encoded as successfully
or as completely as later memories (Tustin and Hayne,
2010). While this ﬁts with a model of episodic memory
that does not become fully functional until late into the
ﬁrst  decade of life (Bauer et al., 2012), it does not accord
with ﬁndings from rodent models of infantile amnesia,
whereby rats demonstrate profoundly impaired long-term
memory for events occurring in early life (<21 days)
despite having previously demonstrated successful initialhe 8–9 year olds). The earliest memories provided by participants in the
en their 1st and 2nd years of life and hence they reported no memories
encoding  (for a review see Callaghan et al., 2014). It is thus
possible  that human infants are successfully encoding the
events  of their early lives in an episodic manner, but that
due  to insufﬁcient or disrupted consolidation processes,
these memories are latter inaccessible. Why  some of these
memories remain accessible in some children for almost a
decade  before succumbing to what seems like an inevitable
fate,  represents an intriguing avenue of episodic memory
research and is one which could potentially offer mecha-
nistic insights into how episodic memories are successfully
encoded, maintained and later recollected across a lifetime.
Interestingly, the neuroscientiﬁc community have very
recently begun to recognise the potential of acquiring an
in-depth  understanding of the phenomenon of infantile
amnesia. For instance, Josselyn and Frankland (2012) pre-
sented  a novel proposal – the neurogenic hypothesis –
which  argues that despite normal (or near normal) ini-
tial  memory formation in the infant brain, the integration
of  new neurons (neurogenesis) during development sub-
sequently degrades the memory either by increasing the
excitability of the hippocampal memory network or by
replacing synaptic connections in pre-existing hippocam-
pal  circuits. As such, this theory essentially asserts that
the  high levels of hippocampal neurogenesis renders “all
hippocampal memories destined to fade as they succumb
to  neurogenesis-induced decay” (Frankland et al., 2013,
p.  5). This hypothesis can potentially account for why
young children may  retain the ability to recollect some
very  early memories while older children and adults cannot
(see  Callaghan et al., 2014, for a description of alterna-
tive molecular mechanisms underlying infantile amnesia).
Considering the complex way in which human episodic
memory is often deﬁned, perhaps elucidation of its early
ontogeny cannot be achieved through behavioural test-
ing  alone. Drawing inspiration from these neuroscientiﬁc
explanations of infantile amnesia, we  wonder if a full
understanding of episodic memory throughout infancy and
childhood  will only be forthcoming when the development
of the neural system supporting these functions is also
taken  into account.
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. Anatomical development
.1.  The structural maturation of the hippocampus
Theories advocating the delayed emergence of a
ippocampal-dependent memory system were initially
upported by anatomical ﬁndings in rats. Infant rats have
ery  immature MTL  structures and this was assumed to
e  also true of human infants (Bachevalier, 1992). But
ippocampal development in human infants is actually
ore advanced (Seress, 2001), with only 15%, as opposed
o  85%, of granule cells in the dentate gyrus being formed
ostnatally in the primate relative to the rodent hip-
ocampus (Bayer, 1980; Rakic and Nowakowski, 1981).
owever, this protracted postnatal development of the
ytoarchitecture of the dentate gyrus (the major route into
he  hippocampus) and a delayed maturation of hippocam-
al  inhibitory interneurons (Seress et al., 1993), have
ed  some to suggest that true hippocampal-dependent
dult-like memory should not be expected earlier than
–5  years of age (Seress and Abraham, 2008; Seress,
001; Huttenlocher and Dabholkar, 1997; Lavenex and
anta  Lavenex, 2013), an age that corresponds with that
ccepted for the offset of infantile amnesia.
Interestingly, in a systematic study of the structural and
olecular changes that occur postnatally in the hippocam-
al  formation of the rhesus macaque monkey, Lavenex and
anta  Lavenex (2013) identiﬁed three distinct hippocampal
ircuits that appear to show a differential rate of postnatal
aturation. First, and consistent with previous observa-
ions, Lavenex and Banta Lavenex observed a protracted
evelopment in the dentate gyrus (which they propose
ay  persist for the ﬁrst decade of human life), and an
ccompanied late development of speciﬁc layers located
ownstream of the dentate gyrus, particularly in the CA3
egion.  In contrast, they noted that distinct layers in several
ippocampal regions that receive direct projections from
he  entorhinal cortex (such as CA1, CA2 and subiculum)
ppear to show early postnatal development. Moreover,
he highly interconnected subcortical structures (subicu-
um,  presubiculum, parasubiculum and CA2) seemed to
evelop  even more rapidly, with tentative evidence of
egressive events in the structural maturation of presubic-
lar  neurons. The culmination of these ﬁndings led the
uthors to conclude that “differential maturation of distinct
ippocampal circuits might underlie the emergence and
aturation of different ‘hippocampus-dependent’ memory
rocesses, ultimately leading to the emergence of episodic
emory concomitant with the maturation of all hippocam-
al  circuits” (Lavenex and Banta Lavenex, 2013, p. 9).
.2.  The neural correlates of infant memory
It is therefore possible that young infants may  acquire
ssociative representations and ﬂexible relational net-
orks  using the same ‘traditional’ associative learning
echanism used by adults, which are presumed to sup-
ort  episodic memory, and depend upon the hippocampus.
f  the human hippocampus matures in a similar way to
he  macaque, these memories’ vulnerability to long-term
orgetting could be due to an incomplete functioning ofgnitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12–29 23
the  hippocampal circuitry. In other words, the continued
beneﬁt brought to memory with increasing age could be a
consequence of the coming online of additional hippocam-
pal  circuits and the concomitant increasing cohesiveness
of hippocampal function.
Alternatively,  the absence of a fully integrated and func-
tional  hippocampus in early infancy could indicate that
the  complex associative processes that are taking place in
early  infancy are not in fact supported by the hippocampus.
For example, this learning may  potentially be supported
by a “fast mapping” mechanism which permits the rapid
acquisition of novel associations and which, unlike tradi-
tional  associative learning mechanisms, does not appear to
depend  upon the hippocampus (Sharon et al., 2011). The
term  fast mapping was coined to describe infants’ rapid
acquisition of words following brief exposure time (Carey
and  Bartlett, 1978), and since then it has been hypoth-
esised to be the general learning mechanism (Markson
and Bloom, 1997) via which very young infants can per-
form  these mnemonic feats (Rovee-Collier and Giles, 2010).
Another  possibility is that the formation of these novel
associations is supported by extra-hippocampal regions
within the MTL, such as the perirhinal cortex, which have
been  shown to support the rapid encoding of novel item
pairs  into single compound (or unitised) units (Haskins
et  al., 2008). Importantly, this form of associative learn-
ing  appears to support familiarity-based recognition, and
not  the rich contextually-bound recollection that under-
pins  episodic memory (e.g. Quamme  et al., 2007). Hence,
determining the nature of the associations encoded by very
young  infants may  be of critical importance in enhancing
our understanding of the relationship between the ability
to  form complex associative memories in early childhood,
and  the very early ontogeny of episodic memory.
The issues alluded to above remain unresolved because
we  have never directly examined the functionality of the
human  infant hippocampus in vivo. Instead, the infant
memory ﬁeld has depended on drawing inferences about
the  functions of the developing hippocampus by using
out-dated theoretical frameworks adapted from the adult
literature, such as using the concept of consciousness,
to determine whether a task taps into hippocampal-
dependent memory or not. This strategy is problematic
because there is every chance these frameworks are
inadequate, and indeed there are numerous examples of
hippocampal-dependent nondeclarative memory in the
adult  literature (e.g. Chun and Phelps, 1999; Ryan et al.,
2000;  Ryan and Cohen, 2004). This approach is less prob-
lematic in the adult literature because the ﬁeld is actively
working with these concepts while simultaneously pursu-
ing  biological evidence for or against these ideas. However,
in  the infant memory literature, where direct neuropsycho-
logical or neuroimaging evidence is rarely acquired, these
concepts are essentially presented as the ground truth. One
then  takes a task, classiﬁes it using tools like the ‘parame-
ter’ and the ‘amnesia’ ﬁlters, and then uses its classiﬁcation
to inform about the underlying infant brain development.
While inferring hippocampal functionality in the infant
through cognitive testing and inference alone may have
been  appropriate three decades ago (when Schacter and
Moscovitch, 1984, proposed their model), surely in this
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era of advanced, non-invasive neuroimaging techniques we
should  be attempting to ask more sophisticated and poten-
tially  more useful questions of this developing system. In
this  way, the infant memory literature could be unshackled
from terms like declarative, explicit and conscious mem-
ory,  terms which have caused theoretical divides within
the  literature. Moreover, when we attempt to address the
question  of the ontogeny of episodic memory, we  run
into  similar problems, caused primarily by the demand
placed on researchers to ﬁnd evidence of complex cogni-
tive  processes considered to tap into the deﬁning qualities
of  episodic memory, such as autonoetic consciousness
(Tulving, 2005). Could many of these problems be miti-
gated  by using neuroimaging techniques to directly study
the  emergence of episodic memory?
4.3. Neuroimaging the ontogeny of episodic memory
Of course, imaging infants and very young children
using techniques such as MRI  is not without its challenges
(Raschle et al., 2012), especially if we wish to explore
cognitive processing in the non-sedated infant. However,
these challenges are not insurmountable. Functional MRI
(fMRI)  data have been successfully acquired in both non-
sedated  spontaneously sleeping infants (e.g. Leroy et al.,
2011;  Anderson et al., 2001) and awake infants (albeit
with a high attrition rate; Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2010).
If  we are interested in understanding the ontogeny of
episodic memory from a neurocognitive perspective, then
the  beneﬁts of such an approach are obvious, enabling
as it would a host of new and exciting questions to be
posed. The most basic issue concerns the developmental
trajectory of the hippocampus and the various hippocam-
pal subﬁelds. For instance, using high-resolution structural
MRI  (Bonnici et al., 2012a), we could ask whether or not
these  distinct regions mature at different rates (as sug-
gested by the monkey work of Lavenex and Banta Lavenex,
2013) and observe and quantify the postnatal structural
changes that occur within the hippocampus and related
MTL  structures. In this way, high-resolution longitudi-
nal data acquired throughout infancy and into childhood
could track the developmental trajectory of these struc-
tures. Moreover, it would extend the interesting ﬁndings
of  Gogtay et al. (2006) who demonstrated, using structural
MRI,  that although the volume of the human hippocampus
remains remarkably heterogeneous between the ages of 4
and  25 years, signiﬁcant differences are evident between
the  posterior (which increases in volume) and the anterior
(which decreases in volume) sub-regions over time.
Acquiring structural MRI  data around the transitional
age of 9 months could also be informative in helping to
clarify  what exactly occurs at this time, informing the major
theoretical accounts of infant memory which speculate that
the  changes observed in infant memory around this age
are  driven by hippocampal maturation. However, we could
also  ask whether such changes are driven by simple time-
dependent maturation processes or are triggered by life
events  such as the onset of independent locomotion (e.g.
Herbert  et al., 2007).
MRI  in infants could, however, potentially provide
much more than structural correlates of hippocampalgnitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12–29
development. For instance, fMRI could enable us to track
the  development of the episodic memory network. This
network is also activated during tasks of prospection, nav-
igation,  theory of mind (Buckner and Carroll, 2007), the
mental  construction of scenes (Hassabis et al., 2007a), and
scene  viewing (Aly et al., 2013). The overlap between the
episodic  memory network and the brain areas engaged by
these  seemingly disparate cognitive processes is unsur-
prising when the complex nature of episodic memory is
considered. For instance, episodic memory depends upon
the  successful development of a wide range of cogni-
tive functions including associative and relational binding
processes, a subjective sense of self in time, and a devel-
oped spatial cognition to support the ‘where’ component
of episodic memory. Spatial cognition alone (upon which
episodic memory is considered to reside; O’Keefe and
Nadel,  1978; Burgess et al., 2002; Maguire and Mullally,
2013) represents a complex set of cognitive processes
which appear to mature at different rates throughout
early and middle childhood (Sluzenski et al., 2004, 2006;
Townsend et al., 2010; Bauer et al., 2012; Ribordy et al.,
2013,  see also Blue et al., 2013, for a discussion of recent
data from infant rhesus macaques). Scene viewing, which
is  a completely passive task in combination with fMRI,
could enable us to track the emergence of the neural net-
work  supporting the development of the episodic memory,
while  simultaneously enabling us to establish the function-
ality  of individual components within the episodic memory
network, such as the hippocampus, and to assess the cohe-
siveness of the network as a whole.
The ability to mentally construct scenes is known to
depend on the hippocampus in adults (Hassabis et al.,
2007b; Mullally et al., 2012). A marker of this is a cogni-
tive  phenomenon known as boundary extension, whereby
people perceive more of a visual scene than was  presented
to  them. This is a robust, consistent, implicit and auto-
matic cognitive effect that is found in adults (Intraub and
Richardson, 1989), children (Seamon et al., 2002) and even
in  3- to 7-month-old infants (Quinn and Intraub, 2007).
Using an fMRI adapted version of this paradigm (such as in
Chadwick  et al., 2013) where again participants passively
view scenes, the emergence of these scene construction
processes, and their relationship with hippocampus and
the  episodic network, could be explored in infancy. Stud-
ies  using these kinds of scene viewing paradigms could
enable us to infer when adult-like episodic memory may  be
neurally  feasible even if behavioural correlates of episodic
memory may  not be attainable until linguistic proﬁciency
is  achieved.
Clearly, the above paradigms require the cooperation
of an awake participant which we  acknowledge is not an
easy  feat in such a young population. One way to cir-
cumvent this challenge is to investigate the emergence
of the resting-state, as opposed to the episodic memory,
network. This is relevant because the episodic memory net-
work  shares numerous similarities with the resting-state
network – a network of spontaneous and intrinsic brain
activity observed in the absence of any overt task perfor-
mance and during the early stages of sleep (Fukunaga et al.,
2006).  A number of studies have already begun to explore
this  network in very young infants. For instance, Gao et al.
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2009) found that 2-week-old infants exhibited a primi-
ive  and incomplete default network that did not appear
o  include the hippocampus. By 1-year of age this network
howed a marked increase in brain regions demonstrat-
ng connectivity but it was not until 2-years of age that
his  network was comparable to that observed in adults
nd  included the medial prefrontal cortex, the posterior
ingulate/retrosplenial cortices, inferior parietal and lat-
ral  temporal cortices, and the hippocampus. Thus, a lack
f  connectivity within the default network would presum-
bly  also be evident in the episodic memory network, and
ould  most likely disrupt the long-term consolidation pro-
esses  necessary to establish enduring episodic memories
n  regions such as the hippocampus and ventro-medial pre-
rontal  cortex (Bonnici et al., 2012b), and could perhaps
xplain why very early episodic memories do not appear to
e  successfully consolidated and accessible in adulthood.
racking development and time-locking these anatom-
cal  and physiological changes to behavioural changes
bserved in memory development could greatly assist our
nderstanding of the neural substrates of mnemonic pro-
esses  and potentially enable the distinct contributions of
omponents of this network to be elucidated.
Of note, functional imaging data are also being success-
ully acquired in awake infants via the use of functional
ear infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS; Meek et al., 1998).
his technique is growing in popularity (Lloyd-Fox et al.,
010;  Vanderwert and Nelson, 2013) because it is light,
on-invasive and can accommodate a degree of move-
ent which enables an infant to remain seated on their
arent’s/carer’s lap throughout the experiment. However,
hile fNIRS measures the same haemodynamic response
s  fMRI, it does not have the spatial resolution of fMRI or
he  ability to penetrate to structures located deep within
he  brain. To date, therefore, it is unsuited to studies whose
rimary goal is to measure the function of the hippocam-
us and surrounding structures, meaning that such studies
ust  persevere with fMRI and the challenges it poses when
ttempting to acquire data from a non-sleeping infant.
imilar problems are associated with the use of scalp-
ecorded event-related potentials (ERPs). Although ERPs
ave  been successfully utilised to address important ques-
ions  about encoding, storage, and consolidation processes
n  the immature brain (e.g. Bauer et al., 2003, 2006), the
nability of ERPs to penetrate to many of the episodic mem-
ry  network structures, such as the hippocampus, renders
hem  of limited use when addressing the above theoretical
uestions.
In  addition to studying the neural correlates of infants’
emories, the results of Tustin and Hayne’s (2010) study
ndicate that the earliest memories of young children (<10-
ears-old) who appear capable of recollecting episodic
vents from early infancy, could provide important insights
nto  how infants’ very earliest episodic memories are sup-
orted  at a neural level, and how these differ from episodic
emories acquired from later time periods. It is possi-
le  that an fMRI analysis technique known as multi-voxel
attern analysis that can be used to ‘decode’ represen-
ations of individual episodic memories in the human
ippocampus and elsewhere solely from patterns of fMRI
ctivity  (Bonnici et al., 2012b; Chadwick et al., 2012), couldgnitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12–29 25
be  particularly useful here. More speciﬁcally, it would
enable us to track the life of individual episodic memories,
hence potentially providing leverage on the phenomenon
of infantile amnesia, and allowing ideas such as the neu-
rogenic hypothesis to be tested in the developing human
brain. Additionally, the use of fMRI in early childhood, in
particular  between the ages of 3- and 4-years, where a
signiﬁcant increase in the long-term retention of episodic
memories is noted (e.g. Scarf et al., 2013; Morgan and
Hayne, 2011) could be helpful in exploring changes in the
episodic  memory network that may  accompany the off-
set  of infantile amnesia. Again, scene-related tasks such as
those  utilised by Chadwick et al. (2013; see also Mullally
et  al., 2012; Quinn and Intraub, 2007) could be advan-
tageous as they place no linguistic demands on young
participants in whom language abilities are still develop-
ing.
In  summary, the data we  have reviewed above sug-
gest that infants are capable of impressive mnemonic feats.
However, these ﬁndings raise as many questions as they
answer. For instance, does the ability to imitate a sequence
of  events, or indeed to successfully infer a relationship
between two items that have never before been seen
together, truly represent the early emergence of episodic
memory? If so, are these abilities related to the matura-
tional status of the hippocampus itself, or to the maturation
of  alternate brain regions (e.g. perirhinal cortex)? Or  are
they  related to a growing cohesion within the episodic
memory network (see also Johnson’s (2001) interactive
specialisation account; cited in Riggins, 2012)? These ques-
tions  are important as the answers to them will form the
cornerstone upon which our understanding of the develop-
ment  of episodic memory (which is believed to persist until
the  end of the ﬁrst decade of life; Bauer et al., 2012) will be
built.  Moreover, addressing the paucity of neuroimaging
data in the infant memory literature will also help to deal
with  the dearth of MRI  studies in the wider developmental
memory literature (Thomas and Jorgenson, 2012).
5. Conclusions
Memory is at the core of our cognitive and social
development. Understanding its ontogeny has important
implications for childcare and education, and for elucidat-
ing  how memory is supported in the adult brain. The past
few  decades have witnessed creative and ingenious ways
of  examining infants in order to appreciate what they are
learning  and if they remember, coupled with insights from
surface  ERP recordings of cortical responses. Models and
testing  of infant memory have been greatly inﬂuenced by a
taxonomy  that was popularised in the adult literature in the
1980s,  which emphasised the dichotomy between declar-
ative  or explicit memory, and nondeclarative or implicit
memory. Because this taxonomy was  in large part driven
by  data from amnesic patients with hippocampal damage,
this  scheme has been used to make inferences about the
functionality of the infant hippocampus.However, in recent years the milieu has changed in
several respects. First, many of the basic tenets of the
memory taxonomy have been challenged leading to a gen-
eral  consensus that distinctions such as explicit/implicit
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are no longer valid particularly in relation to hippocampal
function. Instead, there has been a burgeoning of theories
that  seek to conceptualise the hippocampal contribution to
episodic  memory in particular, and indeed to wider cogni-
tion,  in novel ways that can better account for new data (for
more  on this see Maguire and Mullally, 2013). Second, ﬁnd-
ings  from the infant memory ﬁeld, examples of which we
reviewed  here, undoubtedly indicate that even very young
infants  have a more adept and ﬂexible memory system than
was  previously thought. Similarly, recent data also point to
the  need to ﬁnesse our understanding of infantile amne-
sia.  Third, neurobiological evidence from non-humans is
starting  to accrue that is motivating new hypotheses about
hippocampal development, with potential implications for
interpreting  infant memory data from humans.
Callaghan et al. (2014) recently attempted to renew
interest in understanding infantile amnesia, and urged the
use  of new technologies in molecular biology to unpack the
molecular  basis of this phenomenon. In a similar vein, here
we  suggest that it may  be time for the infant memory ﬁeld
to  take on board new theories of memory and hippocampal
function, and embrace technologies such as MRI  that could
offer  a means of progressing points of dispute. To be clear,
we  are not advocating the abandonment of cognitive test-
ing  of infants in favour of fMRI, rather we suggest that the
use  of MRI  could help to motivate and constrain neurocog-
nitive theories of memory development in human infants.
Indeed, grounding infant memory in neurobiology may  be
even  more important than for adults given the inability of
infants  to disclose anything about their own capabilities.
The challenges of utilising techniques such as fMRI are sub-
stantial,  however, the potential rewards we believe could
be  manifold.
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